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INTRODUCTION

What is in a word? Judges and attorneys are taught that the
English language—full of subtleties and layers—can be wielded
deftly and with the surgical precision necessary to navigate
complicated legal concepts. Yet, some legal concepts are so
haphazardly constructed that their usage creates a bludgeoning
1
effect akin to pounding a square peg into a round hole.
One such concept is the difference between misfeasance and
2
nonfeasance. Misfeasance has been defined as “an act which a
reasonably prudent person would not do, or failing to do
3
something which a reasonably prudent person would do.”
Nonfeasance has been defined as “not performing voluntary
4
tasks . . . where there is no duty to act.” While demarcating the
line between misfeasance and nonfeasance may appear merely as
an academic consideration, the distinction carries real legal
5
consequences in the application of our negligence law.
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance is
particularly important in negligence law because the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction has weighty implications as it
relates to the duty to protect others from the criminal acts of third
6
persons. If the defendant’s act is characterized as misfeasance, a
1. For rationale as to why the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is not
well-suited for duty determinations, see infra notes 2, 12.
2. See generally John M. Adler, Relying Upon The Reasonableness of Strangers:
Some Observations About The Current State of Common Law Affirmative Duties to Aid or
Protect Others, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 867 (1991) (suggesting that the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is antithetical to the aims of the tort system.
“The more fundamental problem with the no-duty-to-rescue framework, however,
is substantive. All of the exceptions to the rule are made necessary by a distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance that is itself fundamentally misguided. In
many situations, it is difficult to see how the distinction is more than semantic play.
But even assuming that a difference between misfeasance and nonfeasance can be
defined (or at least that a difference will continue to be recognized), that
difference is given far too much significance within the traditional legal
framework. As a result, the rules and exceptions based on the distinction often
fail to focus properly on any pronounced or imaginable aims of tort law. Whether
one views the goals of tort law to be the deterrence of unreasonably risky conduct,
the compensation of victims through loss distribution, the imposition of values of
fairness, or some combination of these goals, the focus of the common law rule
based upon the misfeasance-nonfeasance distinction will often undercut those
aims.” Id. at 877–78 (citations omitted)).
3. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Titus, 71 Cal. Rptr. 490, 493 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
4. Lewis v. Razzberries, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 437, 441 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part II.
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duty generally attaches to prevent the harm caused by those
7
actions. If the defendant’s act is characterized as nonfeasance,
there is typically no duty to prevent the harm caused by the third
8
person absent some special relationship.
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently revisited this subject
9
in State v. Back. In Back, the defendant asked her violent and
jealous ex-boyfriend, Nicholas Super, for a ride to the house of
another ex-boyfriend, Daniel Holliday, with whom she was trying to
10
reconcile.
Very soon after arriving, Back slapped a guest and
11
Holliday then
threw at least one beer bottle down the stairs.
escorted Back outside where an argument ensued, during which
12
Super shot and killed Holliday. The Minnesota Supreme Court
held that as a matter of law, there was no duty on the part of Back
13
vis-à-vis the altercation absent a special relationship, at least
14
implying a nonfeasance character to Back’s actions. How would
you characterize Back’s action of asking for a ride and inciting an
altercation with full knowledge of the danger that Super
represented: a) an actionable affirmative act giving rise to a duty to
prevent foreseeable injury, or b) an inactionable omission absent a
special relationship imposing a duty to protect?
The decision in Back shows the difficulty in applying the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. The difficulty in using the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction as a paradigm for
15
adjudicating duty determinations should be a motivating factor in
developing other standards by which we make duty determinations.
One set of standards that attempts to mitigate the confusion
inherent in the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is the

7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part II.
9. 775 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 2009).
10. Id. at 867.
11. Id. at 868.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 872. The court explained that “[u]nder common law principles,
there is generally no duty to protect strangers from the criminal actions of a third
party.” Id. at 870 (citing Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979)).
14. See infra Part IV. The court never specially discusses misfeasance or
nonfeasance in the decision.
15. See, e.g., Adler, supra note 2, at 878 (“Two fundamental problems plague
the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance: (1) in many cases it is
impossible to distinguish the two; and, (2) in cases where intuitively there is a clear
distinction, that distinction does not always coincide with generally accepted
notions about whether liability should attach.”).
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16

Restatement (Third) of Torts. Adopting the concepts contained
in the Restatement would go far in reducing potential confusion
17
surrounding duty determinations.
This note will discuss the murky distinction between
misfeasance and nonfeasance, and how it affects the duty analysis
in negligence law. Part II of this note examines the history of the
18
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, and duty analysis in light of
19
Part III presents the facts and discusses the
this distinction.
20
supreme court’s holding in Back.
Part IV analyzes the court’s
decision
in
Back
and
its
implications
for
the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in the duty element of
21
negligence. Finally, this note concludes that if Minnesota wants to
free itself from the shackles of the misfeasance/nonfeasance
22
distinction, it should adopt a general duty of reasonable care.
II. HISTORY
The distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance has
played an important role in our application of negligence law even
though the meaning of the words misfeasance and nonfeasance
can be confusing at best. To help understand the confusion that
this distinction represents, this section will discuss the origins of the
distinction, the duty element of negligence, and some of the
approaches the courts have used to try and navigate situations
where the misfeasance/nonfeasance determination is not clear-cut.
A.

The Origins of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance Distinction and Its Use
in the Duty Analysis

At early common law, there was no distinction between
23
Not until the 1800s did the
nonfeasance and misfeasance.
16. See infra note 88.
17. See infra note 87.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
21. See infra Part IV.
22. See infra Part V.
23. For a thorough treatment of the origins of misfeasance and nonfeasance,
see Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and Inaction in
the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance From the Fifteenth
Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 827 (1995) (“In sum, the
record reveals that wherever they appeared in decisions between 1400 and 1800,
the words nonfeasance and misfeasance lacked any true conceptual legitimacy.
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distinction begin to crystallize, some say in error. In American
jurisprudence, the maturation of this idea has been traditionally
25
traced to Justice Cardozo. However, even at the time of Cardozo’s
From the early fifteenth to the mid-sixteenth centuries, the courts spoke of
“inactionable nonfeasance” when they meant only to say that a defendant had no
duty to perform a parole agreement. They spoke of misfeasance when they meant
only to say that, under some circumstances, one did have a duty to act toward
others with a certain measure of care and prudence. Yet, in the mid-sixteenth
century, as earlier noted, the common law determined that one did have a duty to
honor a parole agreement. Unwilling to part with the words to which they had
grown attached, the courts then began to write of “inactionable nonfeasance”
when they intended only to rule that one had no duty to honor a gratuitous
promise.”).
24. See, e.g., id. at 826–27 (suggesting that the use of Watton v. Brinth, Y.B.
Mich. 2 Hen. IV, fo. 3v, pl. 9 (1400) in Thorne v. Deas, 4 Johns. 84 (N.Y. 1809) was
an incorrect application of precedent, laying the groundwork for the holding that
one is “responsible for a misfeasance, but not for a nonfeasance.” Id. at 97 (emphasis
added)).
25. See, e.g., Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at 836–39 (noting the difference in
holdings in the landmark cases MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050
(N.Y. 1916) (holding that a duty of care applies to foreseeable others regardless of
privity of contract) and H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899
(N.Y. 1928) (holding that there was no liability because there was “mere negligent
omission, unaccompanied by malice or other aggravating elements”)). In Moch,
Cardozo wrote:
A time-honored formula often phrases the distinction as one between
misfeasance and nonfeasance. Incomplete the formula is, and so at times
misleading. Given a relation involving in its existence a duty of care
irrespective of a contract, a tort may result as well from acts of omission
as of commission in the fulfillment of the duty thus recognized by law.
What we need to know is not so much the conduct to be avoided when
the relation and its attendant duty are established as existing. What we
need to know is the conduct that engenders the relation. It is here that
the formula, however incomplete, has its value and significance. If
conduct has gone forward to such a stage that in action would commonly
result, not negatively merely in withholding a benefit, but positively or
actively in working an injury, there exists a relation out of which arises a
duty to go forward.
159 N.E. at 898 (citations omitted). Of this decision, Rowe & Silver note:
Cardozo’s view as set forth in Moch governs decisions to the present day.
It seems to provide that no omission is actionable unless first preceded by
something fairly to be called positive action. He asks whether ‘conduct’
has gone forward to such a stage that inaction would commonly ‘produce
harm.’ It is important that in Cardozo’s view, liability for omission rests
on some underlying conduct through which the omission arose and does
therefore depend at bottom on the distinction between action and
inaction.
Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at 839 (citations omitted). See also id. at 839–40
(“Within the judicial arena, it seems that Cardozo more than others forged a
concept of duty generally and in particular attempted to explain, adequately or
not, the seeming paradox that (1) omission may generate actionable negligence
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decisions, confusion regarding the misfeasance/nonfeasance
distinction was already apparent. Cardozo himself characterized
26
the formulation as “[i]ncomplete . . . and so at times misleading.”
Nevertheless, many jurisdictions—including Minnesota—have
27
Still, courts
utilized the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.
but (2) that an individual is generally exculpated if his behavior were
characterized as nonfeasance.” (citations omitted)).
26. Moch, 159 N.E. at 898 (citations omitted). This incomplete formulation is
further illustrated by a disconnect between scholarly work of that era and
contemporaneous judicial decisions. See generally Rowe & Silver, supra note 23 at
841–44 (illustrating that the perspective of Professor Bohlen in Francis H. Bolen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV. 217 (1908)
does not adequately explain decisions of the courts:
[Bohlen] maintains, “nonfeasance” simply refers to that situation in
which a defendant does no “positive” harm, and “misfeasance” to the
situation in which by “interference” with the plaintiff, the defendant does
“positive” harm . . . . Bohlen’s perspective on misfeasance and
nonfeasance seems palpably inadequate to explain the jurisprudential
phenomenon at issue. It fails to explain Thorne v. Deas, allegedly the first
American case in which the matter arose. The Thorne case involved a loss
for which the plaintiff was uninsured. The defendant had promised,
without consideration, to procure insurance, but failed to keep his word.
The report indicated that the plaintiff would have procured insurance on
his own absent the defendant’s promise. Therefore, the defendant did
subject the plaintiff to a “positive” loss; the plaintiff’s position was
genuinely worsened by the defendant’s inaction. If the defendant had
not made his promise, the plaintiff would have had his insurance and the
loss would have been compensated. Yet, the court ruled that the case
involved only inactionable nonfeasance; Bohlen’s formulation does not
explain the result.
(citations omitted)). See also Harold F. McNiece & John V. Thornton, Affirmative
Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L.J. 1272, 1272–73 (1949) (suggesting that Bohlen’s
formulation does not work because most nonfeasance is a sort of pseudononfeasance).
27. See, e.g., Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W. 1, 2 (1907)
(holding the defendant liable for breaching his duty when he created a risk of
harm to the plaintiff by turning him out into a blizzard: “The facts of this case
bring it within the more comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed
in such a position with regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does not use
due care in his own conduct, he will cause injury to that person, the duty at once
arises to exercise care commensurate with the situation in which he thus finds
himself, and with which he is confronted, to avoid such danger; and a negligent
failure to perform the duty renders him liable for the consequences of his
neglect.”); see also Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999) (holding
that homeowners owed no duty to the plaintiff to take precautions to avoid
aggravating an injury to a house guest); Donaldson v. Young Women’s Christian
Ass’n of Duluth, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792–93 (Minn. 1995) (holding that association
owed no duty to prevent the suicide of a resident:
Courts have traditionally shown reluctance to impose liability on others
for self-inflicted harm. Certain special relationships, however, do create a
legal duty to protect another from self-inflicted harm. That duty has most
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have noted the difficulties present in these determinations, at one
point noting that the distinction between misfeasance and
28
nonfeasance was “fanciful.”
Notwithstanding confusion surrounding its application, the
use of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction is deeply rooted in
29
the jurisprudence of tort law. As a general proposition, courts
recognize that one owes a duty “to avoid affirmatively causing
30
physical harm to others.” In other words, courts will generally
hold a person accountable for their misfeasance or “affirmative
actions,” when such actions expose others to an unreasonable risk
31
of harm.
This accountability generally does not depend on
whether that harm arises from an act—criminal or otherwise—of a
32
third person.
often been found where an institution such as a hospital or jail has
physical custody and control of the person to be protected.
Id. at 792 (citations omitted)).
28. As early as 1910, the Minnesota Supreme Court held,
[f]rom the facts stated in the complaint it satisfactorily appears that
appellant undertook the execution of the duty of replacing the gauge,
and that he performed it negligently; hence his act was one of
misfeasance, and not one of nonfeasance. This fact distinguishes the
case from Drake v. Hagen, 108 Tenn. 265, 67 S.W. 470, and Van Antwerp
v. Linton, 89 Hun, 417, 35 N.Y. Supp. 318. Strictly speaking, the act of the
engineer in failing to put on the guard, was nonfeasance—that is, in not
doing an act which he was required to perform; but the distinction
between misfeasance and nonfeasance is sometimes fanciful.
Brower v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 109 Minn. 385, 388, 124 N.W. 10, 11 (1910).
29. See generally Rowe & Silver, supra note 23.
30. W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REV. 739, 751 (2005).
31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (“In
general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise
the care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of
harm to them arising out of the act.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B
(1965) (“An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should
realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to another through the
conduct of the other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even
though such conduct is criminal.”); see also id., cmt. e (“There are, however,
situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is required to anticipate and
guard against the intentional, or even criminal, misconduct of others. In general,
these situations arise where the actor is under a special responsibility toward the
one who suffers the harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such
intentional misconduct; or where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or
exposed the other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such
misconduct, which a reasonable man would take into account.” (emphasis
added)).
32. Id. See also McIntyre v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 2d 54, 106–07 (D.
Mass. 2006) (“The question of duty, on the present record, is much simpler,
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Conversely, courts generally recognize that there is no duty to
prevent harm caused by one’s nonfeasance—meaning there is no
“duty to warn, protect, or rescue a person from risks created by
33
another source.” This distinction reflects the maturation of tort
34
law generally.
An excellent illustration of an application of both aspects of
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction can be found in Touchette
35
v. Ganal. In Touchette, defendant Mrs. Ganal and Mr. Touchette
36
were involved in an extra-marital affair. As her relationship with
37
her husband deteriorated, Ganal moved into her parents’ house.
Allegedly, during her time at her parent’s house, she taunted her
38
husband by flaunting her affair with Touchette. This caused her
husband to go on a violent rampage, killing Ganal’s parents,
burning Touchette’s home to the ground, and causing the death of

because it is to be determined not on the basis of what the relevant actor . . . failed
to do, but on his commission of an act. ‘Speaking in terms of classical tort
principle, when one claims that negligence lies in the commission of an act, a
defendant’s duty not to behave negligently typically extends to include all those
whom the defendant might reasonably have foreseen to be potential victims of the
negligence.’ . . . This duty does not depend on any special relationship between
employees of the [defendant] and [the third party] or between employees of the
[defendant] and [the plaintiff]. Indeed it does not depend on . . . any . . .
person’s, status as [a defendant]. It is simply the duty that one person owes to
another to act with care when he knows or should know that his action poses an
unreasonable risk of harm to the other through the intentional conduct of a third
person.” (quoting Carrier v. Riddell, Inc., 721 F.2d 867, 868 (1st Cir. 1983))
(emphasis in original)).
33. Cardi, supra note 30, at 751. Said another way, “[t]he duties of one who
merely omits to act are more restricted, and in general are confined to situations
where there is a special relation between the actor and the other which gives rise
to the duty.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965).
In the early law one who injured another by a positive affirmative act was
held liable without any great regard even for his fault. But the courts
were far too much occupied with the more flagrant forms of misbehavior
to be greatly concerned with one who merely did nothing, even though
another might suffer serious harm because of his omission to act. Hence
liability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in the law.
It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situations in which
there was some special relation between the parties, on the basis of which
the defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or
protection of the plaintiff.
Id.
35. 922 P.2d 347 (Haw. 1996).
36. Id. at 348.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 349.
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39

Touchette’s infant child.
In analyzing whether summary judgment was appropriate, the
Hawaii Supreme Court in Touchette first determined—as a matter of
law—if Ganal’s acts were to be characterized as nonfeasance, a
marital relationship was not a special relationship that gave rise to a
40
duty to protect persons from the acts of another. But the supreme
41
It went on to analyze the duty
court did not stop there.
requirement with regard to whether the defendant’s acts should be
considered misfeasance on the basis of whether her actions created
an unreasonable risk of harm, and thus her actions created a duty
under sections 302, 302A, and/or 302B of the Restatement
42
(Second) of Torts. The court determined that Ganal’s actions did
create an unreasonable risk of harm, and therefore, she owed
43
Touchette a duty.
In Minnesota, the early cases seem to pay deference to both
44
aspects of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, even when
45
the cases before the court involved the criminal acts of others.
Minnesota has upheld a jury verdict that found a defendant liable
46
for the damage caused by a thief who stole the defendant’s car,
and has remanded a case in which summary judgment was granted
47
under similar circumstances. One argument for an imposition of
duty was that this class of cases fell under a city ordinance, and

39. Id. at 348–49.
40. Id. at 352–55.
41. Id. at 355–57.
42. Id. at 357 (“Although the circuit court’s holding, as previously discussed,
was correct regarding the question of [Ganal]’s duty to [Touchette] to
affirmatively warn or to control [her husband] pursuant to sections 315 and 314A
[requiring a special relationship], the circuit court failed to determine if [Ganal]
owed a duty to [Touchette] pursuant to other authority, especially in view of
appellant’s counsel’s many attempts to direct the circuit court’s attention to the
potential viability of appellant’s claims against [Ganal] based on the breach of the
duty set out in sections 302, 302A[,] and/or 302B.”).
43. Id. at 357–58.
44. See supra notes 27–28.
45. See Garceau v. Engel, 169 Minn. 62, 210 N.W. 608 (1926) (upholding
ruling in favor of the plaintiff for the cost of goods stolen when the defendant
negligently left the keys in the door and allowed a thief to gain access to the
premises).
46. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grain Belt Breweries, Inc., 309 Minn.
376, 245 N.W.2d 186 (1976) (reversing judgment notwithstanding verdict for the
defendant after trial court rendered a jury verdict for the plaintiff).
47. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn.
1978) (remanded to allow a jury to determine if the duty was breached).
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48

there was negligence (or duty) per se. However, later rulings by
49
the supreme court seem to have invalidated this position.
50
In Lundgren v. Fultz, the supreme court reversed a finding by
the lower courts that no duty existed to protect against the criminal
acts of others when a defendant psychiatrist allowed his patient to
51
come into possession of some firearms. Lundgren is interesting
because it seems to blur the distinction between misfeasance and
nonfeasance. On the one hand, the supreme court set out to show
that the defendant may have had a duty according to some special
52
relationship. On the other hand, the supreme court indicated
that foreseeability of the risk of harm, by itself, may give rise to a
53
duty.
In essence, the supreme court in Lundgren said that a
reasonable jury may find a duty under either the special
relationship requirement or foreseeability of the risk of harm
arising out of the same set of facts. That is, the supreme court
seems to be implying that the defendant’s actions could reasonably
be characterized as either nonfeasance or misfeasance, respectively.
So, while it appears that Minnesota has strong inclinations
towards
nonfeasance
determinations
in
applying
the
54
nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction,
in limited situations,
48. See, e.g., Anderson v. Theisen, 231 Minn. 369, 43 N.W.2d 272 (1950)
(determining if the criminal act was an intervening cause because the duty issue
was not appealed), overruled by Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 630; see also
Wannebo v. Gates, 227 Minn. 194, 34 N.W.2d 695 (1948) (determining if the
criminal act was an intervening cause because the duty issue was not appealed),
overruled by Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d 630.
49. See, e.g., Illinois Farmers Ins. Co., 273 N.W.2d at 638 (“Although the
purpose of the ordinance may be to promote the safety of those using the public
streets, we would be disregarding the clear language of the ordinance if we
declared that its violation is negligence per se. Nevertheless, the passage of the
ordinance indicates that the governing body of the city of St. Paul recognizes the
danger of leaving ignition keys in a parked, unlocked car. That such danger exists
and has been addressed by a legislative body may be considered by the jury in
determining whether Ochsner should have foreseen that leaving the keys in the
trunk created a risk to those using the public streets.).
50. 354 N.W.2d 25 (Minn. 1984).
51. Id. at 26–27.
52. See, e.g., id. at 27 (“In law, we are not our brother’s keeper unless ‘a
special relationship exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a
duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct.’” (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965)).
53. Id. at 28 (“Justice Cardozo succinctly expressed the central relationship
between the foreseeability of harm and the existence of a legal duty in Palsgraf,
stating that ‘the risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed.’”
(quoting Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928)).
54. Almost to the point of ignoring the general proposition that “anyone who
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Minnesota courts have found reason to blur the distinction
55
Minnesota courts have
between misfeasance and nonfeasance.
also found an existence of a duty to protect another from the harm
resulting from criminal acts of third persons when misfeasance
gives rise or otherwise creates an opportunity for the commission of
56
the criminal act.
B.

Minnesota’s Move to a General Duty of Reasonable Care and Its
Influence on Recognizing a Duty for the Harms Caused by the
Criminal Acts of Others

Since at least the 1970s, an articulative adherence to both
aspects of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction seems to have
57
waned, causing an apparent atrophy in the application of
58
misfeasance in Minnesota law. Such an approach is in opposition
does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of a
reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them
arising out of the act.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965).
55. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 45–47.
57. See, e.g., Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483–84 (Minn. 1979). In
Delgado, the court articulates that “[o]rdinarily there is no duty to control the
conduct of a third person to prevent him from causing physical harm to another
unless a special relationship exists.” Id. at 483. Such language is consistent with
the nonfeasance aspect of the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction. However,
without specifically enumerating what constitutes the misfeasance aspect of the
distinction, the court holds there is a duty because the defendants were engaged
in an extremely dangerous activity, and thus, “created an unreasonable risk of
harm.” Id. at 484. This imposition of a duty is consistent with the misfeasance
aspect of the distinction. Because the court did not articulate the general
misfeasance principle, future court decisions are seemingly untethered from it.
58. See, e.g., Sarau v. Oliver, No. C1-00-223, 2000 WL 1052143, at *2 (Minn.
Ct. App. Aug. 1, 2000). In Sarau, the court stated,
[a]ppellant cites Restatement of Torts (Second) § 302 as support for the
argument that respondent owed a duty to protect appellant from the
actions of her son. But this provision concerns only the character of a
failure to act and does not address the existence of a duty. See
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 cmt. a (1965). If there is no duty to
act, a failure to act does not subject the actor to liability. Restatement
(Second) of Torts §§ 302 cmt. a; 302B cmt a. And there is no duty to act
to protect another unless there is a special relationship that gives rise to
such a duty. Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 302 cmt a.
Id. The court of appeals seems intently focused on the nonfeasance aspect of the
distinction, apparently ignoring misfeasance in the determination of duty.
Comment a to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302 states that “[i]n
general, anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the
care of a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to
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with the march to a general duty of reasonable care, which
Minnesota embarked on when it embraced a general duty of
60
reasonable care in the context of entrants on land.
The transition to a general duty of reasonable care for tortious
conduct has been slow to gain traction. In 1968, California
abolished the categorical approach to landowner duty in favor of a
61
general duty of reasonable care to all entrants.
In 1972,
Minnesota joined other jurisdictions and moved closer to a general
62
duty of reasonable care to entrants on land. Under the standard
articulated in Roland there is a general duty of reasonable care for
entrants on land regardless of whether the entrant is a business63
invitee, licensee, or trespasser. This notion of a general duty of
reasonable care is in accord with the idea that we should be held
64
accountable for the risk of harm that we create.
them arising out of the act.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965)
(emphasis added). Thus, section 302 does seem to address the existence of a duty.
In combination with section 302B, the Restatement seems to hold that such a duty
is not extinguished just because the risk of harm is “through the conduct of the
other or a third person which is intended to cause harm, even though such
conduct is criminal.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302B (1965). This is
further articulated in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 302B comment e:
There are, however, situations in which the actor, as a reasonable man, is
required to anticipate and guard against the intentional, or even
criminal, misconduct of others. In general, these situations arise where
the actor is under a special responsibility toward the one who suffers the
harm, which includes the duty to protect him against such intentional
misconduct; or where the actor’s own affirmative act has created or exposed the
other to a recognizable high degree of risk of harm through such misconduct, which
a reasonable man would take into account.
Id. (emphasis added).
59. See Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from the majority’s holding that the landowner owed no
duty because landowners owe entrants a duty “to use reasonable care for the safety of
all such persons invited upon the premises regardless of the status of the
individuals.” (quoting Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639,
647 (1972)(emphasis added)); see also Adler, supra note 2, at 902–04 (advocating
Wisconsin’s approach to negligence, in which a duty exists for both nonfeasance
and misfeasance).
60. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)
(abolishing the limited, categorical duties landowners owed to licensees and
invitees in favor of a general duty of reasonable care to all invited entrants).
61. Roland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (“[T]o focus upon the
status of the injured party . . . in order to determine the question whether the
[defendant] has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores and
humanitarian values.”).
62. See Peterson, 199 N.W.2d at 647.
63. Roland, 443P.2d at 565–68.
64. Id. at 564 (“Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a
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However, in Minnesota, other aspects of negligence law—such
as the duty to protect others from the criminal acts of another—
have yet to fully embrace the notion of a general duty of reasonable
65
care. In Minnesota, “[i]f the law is to impose a duty on A to protect
B from C’s criminal acts, the law usually looks for a special
66
relationship between A and B”
This language has a strong
correlation to the nonfeasance formulation presented by Cardozo.
67
In particular, if there is no conduct, then a duty only attaches if
68
“there exists a relation out of which arises a duty [to protect].”
Minnesota courts generally have found a special relationship
to exist between common carriers with their passengers, innkeepers with their patrons, possessors of land that hold their

position with regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think
would at once recognise [sic] that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his
own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill
to avoid such danger.” (quoting Heaven v. Pender (1883) 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509)).
65. As a general proposition, there is no duty to protect others from the
criminal actions of a third party.
Ordinarily, there is no duty to control the conduct of a third person to
prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless a special
relationship exists, either between the actor and the third person which
imposes a duty to control, or between the actor and the other which gives
the other the right of protection.
Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979).
66. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989) (emphasis
added). The court in Erickson went on to say that such a relationship exists when
“B has in some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has accepted that
entrustment.” Id. Compare Bjerke v. Johnson, 742 N.W.2d 660, 667 (Minn. 2007)
(holding that a homeowner had a special relationship with a minor child she
invited to live in her home, and therefore had a duty to protect the child from
being sexually assaulted by another resident) with H.B. ex rel. Clark v. Whittemore,
552 N.W.2d 705, 707–10 (Minn. 1996) (stating that a special relationship did not
exist between a mobile park manager and the resident children and therefore no
duty existed to protect the children from sexual abuse) and Pietila v. Congdon,
362 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (holding that a special
relationship did not exist between a homeowner and a person invited on the
premises, and therefore the homeowner had no duty to protect the person from
the criminal actions of a third person).
67. In other words, nonfeasance.
68. R.H. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 899 (N.Y. 1928); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c (1965). Comment c states:
Hence liability for non-feasance was slow to receive any recognition in
the law. It appeared first in, and is still largely confined to, situations in
which there was some special relation between the parties, on the basis of
which the defendant was found to have a duty to take action for the aid or
protection of the plaintiff.
Id. (emphasis added).
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premises open to the public with those who are lawfully on the
premises, employers with their employees, schools with their
students, and custodians with those for whom they are
69
responsible.
The rationale articulated by the court for limiting a duty to
protect against the criminal actions of third persons is that it would
not be fair to hold one accountable for the criminal acts of
70
another. In Pietila, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated,
[h]ow can one know what measures will protect against
the thug, the narcotic addict, the degenerate, the
psychopath and the psychotic? Must the owner prevent all
crime? Inasmuch as no police force has ever achieved
that goal, the plaintiff cannot intend the imposition of an
71
absolute obligation to prevent all crime.
Even with this articulated public policy limitation, Minnesota has
found reasons to blur the bright-line rule that there is no duty to
prevent the acts of third persons.
C.

The Special Circumstances Doctrine in Minnesota and Abroad

One way in which Minnesota has softened this bright-line rule
is through the adoption of the special circumstances doctrine,
which allows a court to impose a duty if the criminal act is
foreseeable or if the defendant’s preventative action is not overly
72
Minnesota adopted the special circumstances
burdensome.
doctrine in State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Grain Belt
73
Breweries, Inc. Under the special circumstances doctrine, courts—
as a matter of law—can create exceptions to the no-duty to prevent

69. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 553 N.W.2d 40, 49 (Minn. 1996) (“[S]pecial
relationships exist between parents and children, masters and servants, possessors
of land and licensees, common carriers and their customers, or people who have
custody of a person with dangerous propensities.” (quoting Delgado v. Lohmar,
289 N.W.2d 479, 483–84 (Minn. 1979) (emphasis removed))). These special
relationships mirror the exceptions enumerated in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §§ 314A, 314B (1965).
70. Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333.
71. Id. (quoting Goldberg v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 297 (N.J.
1962)).
72. Felty v. City of Lawton, 578 P.2d 757, 761 (Okla. 1977)
73. 309 Minn. 376, 380, 245 N.W.2d 186, 189 (1976) (“Special circumstances
which impose a greater potentiality of foreseeable risk or more serious injury, or
require a lesser burden of preventative action, may be deemed to impose an
unreasonable risk on, and a legal duty to, third persons.” (quoting Hergenrether
v. East, 393 P.2d 164, 166 (Cal. 1964))).
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the acts of third persons rule when a special circumstance exists.
“[I]n some ‘special circumstances’, the negligen[t] acts of a third
person are so foreseeable that such acts cannot properly be viewed
as independent intervening causes. Accordingly . . . under certain
‘special circumstances’, a special duty to prevent the actions of a
75
third person arises.”
The special circumstances doctrine is broader than the special
relationship requirement in that a special circumstance is analyzed
according to the foreseeability of an act and does not rely on
76
traditional notions of a special relationship.
It could also be
argued that the special circumstances doctrine has more limited
applications than the special relationship requirement because the
analysis has typically been limited to the class of cases involving car
77
theft in general, and key-in-ignition cases more specifically.
However, the courts have used language that would allow
additional classes of cases to take advantage of the special
circumstances doctrine. For example, one court noted that,
[m]any jurisdictions have held that under “special” or
“unusual” circumstances, a duty may exist where a
defendant should reasonably anticipate that its conduct
will create an unreasonably enhanced danger to one in
the position of the injured plaintiff. If such danger is
foreseeable, then a duty arises to exercise reasonable care
74. See Felty, 578 P.2d at 762 (concluding that the theft of a car with keys in
the ignition and injury to another can be foreseeable in special circumstances, but
affirming the defendant’s general demurrer because no special circumstances
were pleaded); see also Hergenrether, 393 P.2d at 167–68 (holding that leaving a
vehicle unlocked with the keys in the ignition was a special circumstance that
created a duty to protect against the injuries caused when the vehicle was stolen
and involved in a head-on automobile accident); Cruz v. Middlekauff LincolnMercury, Inc., 909 P.2d 1252, 1256 (Utah 1996) (finding upon interlocutory
review that a duty not to leave keys in the ignition of unlocked cars at an auto
dealership may have arisen upon special circumstances).
75. Felty, 578 P.2d at 761.
76. An act may also be analyzed according to the gravity of the harm or the
burden of preventive action. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Minn. at 380,
245 N.W.2d at 189 (describing how the facts of each case must be considered to
determine whether the defendant had a duty).
Regardless, the special
circumstances doctrine provides a broader scope of liability for defendants when
the harm results from the criminal acts because there is no requisite showing of a
special relationship needed to impose a duty.
77. See, e.g., Ill. Farmers Ins. Co. v. Tapemark Co., 273 N.W.2d 630 (Minn.
1978) (reaffirming State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Minn. 376 (holding that a
special circumstance existed giving rise to duty when the defendant’s employees
left their keys in the car and damage to the plaintiff’s insured was caused by a thief
of said car)); see also supra note 74.
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78

for the safety of others.
When the weight of the foreseeability is great, it would seem that—
as a matter of public policy—these courts impose a duty to protect
79
those at risk.
There are potential pitfalls with the special circumstances
doctrine. In particular, legal scholars have illustrated that folding
the foreseeability determination into the duty analysis may have a
80
harmful effect on the law. For example, if a court decides—as a
matter of law—that a special circumstance exists, there is at least an
implication that the court has also decided that there was sufficient
foreseeability as a matter of law. Because foreseeability plays a role
81
in determining the breach issue, the court has at least impliedly
decided that issue as well. When the court is making a duty
determination based on foreseeability, they are in effect weighing
82
the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the breach issue—a task
78. Cruz, 909 P.2d at 1255.
79. See id. (“Each case must be considered on its own facts to determine
whether they result in a foreseeable risk of harm to third persons in the class of
plaintiffs and thus create a duty to refrain from subjecting them to such risk.”); see
also Hergenrether, 393 P.2d at 167 (“[E]ach case must be considered on its own facts
to determine whether the joint effect of them in toto justifies the conclusion that
the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and that the defendant . . .
has a duty to third persons in the class of the plaintiffs to refrain from subjecting
them to such risk.”).
80. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30. W. Jonathan Cardi states:
At the very least, foreseeability’s indeterminacy leads judges to treat like
cases differently and different cases alike. . . . [Foreseeability] may be
little more than a surrogate for unbound judicial discretion.
Furthermore, to the extent that reference to foreseeability masks the
actual reasons for a judge’s decision to impose or deny negligence
liability, foreseeability obfuscates the judicial process and likely
undermines its perceived legitimacy.
Id. at 740–41; John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733 (1998). The article claims:
The courts’ uncertainty about what to do with duty is displayed in their
uneven use of the concept of foreseeability. Sometimes foreseeability is
deemed part of the issue of breach and thus left to the jury. Other times
it is deemed the essence of duty and kept for the courts. Still other times
it is left for the jury under the heading of proximate cause. What one
court finds unforeseeable as a matter of law, another court will find
foreseeable as a matter of law. Foreseeability is sometimes a necessary
condition of liability, sometimes a sufficient condition, and sometimes
merely a factor. Far from cleaning up duty-analysis, the concept of
foreseeability illustrates the confusion courts currently experience
dealing with the duty element.
Id. at 1776.
81. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30, at 744–45 nn.17–24.
82. A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010)
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which is generally regarded as being the providence of the jury.
The Restatement (Third) of Torts has attempted to address
this particular issue by presuming a duty if the actor’s conduct
84
creates a risk of physical harm. Conversely, there is a no-duty
85
presumption if the risk of harm is created by another source.
However, the Third Restatement’s approach is not without its
86
critics. While it is beyond the scope of this note to weigh in on the
merits of the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ approach, for the
purposes of this note it is sufficient to recognize at least a potential

(“While we purported to be discussing duty, we were in fact assuming the
conclusion we claimed to be proving, and we were actually evaluating the
sufficiency of the evidence . . . .”).
83. See, e.g., Cardi, supra note 30. The article states that:
The second problem with foreseeability’s role in duty is that it operates as
a vehicle by which judges decide questions traditionally reserved for the
jury. Specifically, by resolving duty based on an analysis of whether the
risk created by a defendant’s conduct was foreseeable, judges are really
deciding whether the defendant’s conduct was reasonable—the essence
of a jury’s determination of breach.
Id. at 741.
84. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARMS § 7 (2010). Section 7(b) does give the courts the ability to make no-duty
rules to support different policies. But only “[i]n exception cases, when an
articulated countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
liability.” Id. § 7(b).
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARMS § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
86. See Cardi, supra note 30, at 742 (discussing courts’ utilization of
foreseeability to determine duty in negligence cases and the implications of recent
installments to the Restatement (Third) of Torts on that process). In a generally
favorable treatment of the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts,
Cardi mentions that
[o]ne might argue that it is not the place of a Restatement to effect such
drastic reform in negligence law and in courts’ ability to administer that
law. . . . The proper reach of a Restatement is a valid concern . . .
however, the proposed Restatement will, if adopted by the courts, likely
affect the substantive outcome of negligence cases only at the margins.
Id.; John C. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place
of Duty in Negligence Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 657, 724 (2001) (finding that the drafted
approach does not fairly and helpfully restate the law and advocating that
negligence without duty is ill-conceived); see, e.g., Jane Stapleton, The Risk
Architecture of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1309, 1332
(2009) (“[T]he ‘risk architecture’ of the Restatement (Third) could have been
presented with far greater clarity. Key ‘risk’ notions have not been explicitly
defined. Terminology has not been deployed consistently. Obfuscating synonyms
have been used with no attempt made to explain their relation to other risk
notions in the Restatement (Third). All this threatens to undermine the userfriendliness of the end product.”).
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ideological shift to a presumed duty, a move away from the
88
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction, and internalize the possible
89
benefits of that approach.
III. THE BACK DECISION
A.

The Facts

Danna Back and Daniel Holliday “had been dating off and on
90
for several years.” Their relationship initially deteriorated in 2003
when Back and Holliday moved in together, and by the summer of
91
2006, Back moved out.
92
During the summer of 2006, Back also dated Nicholas Super,
93
Back
causing escalated tensions between Holliday and Super.
knew of threats made by Super against Holliday and told police

87. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARM § 7
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (illustrating that a presumed duty for the
creation of risk would put the foreseeability question into the hands of the jury as
a breach determination), and Cardi, supra note 30, at 739 (illustrating the benefits
of removing foreseeability from the duty determination), with Goldberg, supra
note 86, at 663 (suggesting that the confusion surrounding the concept of duty
does not warrant a wholesale change to the negligence doctrine).
88. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARMS § 37 cmt. c
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
Misfeasance and nonfeasance have a long history as concepts that explain
the distinction between affirmatively creating risk and merely failing to
prevent harm. However, this distinction can be misleading. The proper
question is not whether an actor’s specific failure to exercise reasonable
care is an error of commission or omission. Instead, it is whether the
actor’s entire conduct created a risk of physical harm. For example, a
failure to employ an automobile’s brakes or a failure to warn about a
latent danger is not a case of nonfeasance governed by the rules in this
Chapter, because in those cases the entirety of the actor’s conduct
(driving an automobile or selling a product) created a risk of harm. This
is so even though the specific conduct alleged to be a breach of the duty
of reasonable care was itself an omission.
Id.
89. As it relates to foreseeability see, for example, Cardi, supra note 30, at
767–804 (noting a shift in power from judge to jury and restraining erosions in the
rule of law due to foreseeability’s malleability, e.g., the lack of transparency
inherent in foreseeability-based determinations obscuring potential abuses of
judicial power). Similar arguments could be made regarding the malleability of
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.
90. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 867 (Minn. 2009).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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that “Super threatened Holliday with a gun several times.” In one
incident, Super “[drove] over to Holliday’s . . . and point[ed] his
95
gun at [Holliday].”
In another incident, Super fired shots at
96
Holliday’s home while Back was there spending the night. Back
stated that she “believed that Super fired those shots because he
97
was jealous of Back being with Holliday,” and even noted on the
night of the incident that “it was probably Nick trying to send a
98
message because he knew that she was over there that night.”
In the early morning hours of January 1, 2007, Back called
Holliday around 3:00 a.m., after being out with other friends to
99
celebrate New Year’s Eve. She apparently intended to renew her
relationship with Holliday, but was angered when she heard
100
women’s voices in the background. Holliday asked Back to come
over and Back called Super who agreed to drive her to Holliday’s
101
house.
Back intended to start an altercation with Holliday and those
102
at the party. In particular, Back intended “to go over there and
103
fight the girls.” Once she arrived, Back slapped one of Holliday’s
104
friends “because [she could],” then grabbed a beer bottle and
105
Shortly after her theatrics, Back and
threw it down the stairs.
106
Holliday began to argue.
After Back did not heed Holliday’s
requests to leave, Holliday grabbed Back by the arm and escorted
107
her outside.

94. Id. “Back did not testify at trial, but the police conducted a videotaped
interview with her after the shooting. This interview was played for the jury during
trial.” Id. at n.3.
95. Brief of Respondent, Back, 775 N.W.2d at 866, (No. A08-17), 2009 WL
4917088 at *3 (citations to the trial transcript omitted).
96. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted).
97. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.
98. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *3 (citations to the trial transcript
omitted).
99. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *3.
103. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted).
104. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted).
105. Id. (citations to the trial transcript omitted).
106. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868.
107. Id.
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Once outside, Holliday noticed that Super was there and the
108
As the argument escalated, “Holliday
two began to argue.
extended his arm, apparently in an effort to push Super off the
109
stairs leading from the yard to the deck.”
In response, Super
110
pulled a gun out and shot Holliday. Super fled, but Back stayed
111
to perform CPR until the police arrived.
In addition, “after the
police were called but before they arrived, the phone rang at
Holliday’s house and, when Brandon Senescall answered it, Nick
Super said ‘That’s what you get when you [expletive deleted] with
112
113
me, bitch.’” Despite Back’s efforts, Holliday died at the scene.
In the police interview following the shooting, Back stated that
114
she did not know that Super had a gun that night, but she did
mention that Super was known to keep a gun under the seat of his
115
She also mentioned that Super was “known to pull his gun
car.
116
out on anybody.”
B.

The Lower Courts’ Holdings

Following Holliday’s death, Back was indicted by a grand jury
117
for first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree domestic abuse
118
119
murder,
and second-degree intentional murder.
At the
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *4 (citations to the trial transcript
omitted).
113. Id. Super was subsequently convicted of second-degree intentional
murder. See State v. Super, No. A09-242, 2010 WL 1541184, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 20, 2010).
114.
Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *8 (citations to the trial transcript
omitted). It is also important to note that “although [Back] stated to police that
she did not know that Super had a gun, the jury was not obligated to believe her;
the jury was able to view her demeanor in the videotaped statement to police and
could—and in all likelihood did—determine that she was lying.” Id.
115. See, e.g., Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *2 (citations to the trial
transcript omitted).
116. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868. But Back also noted that “Super had dropped
her off at Holliday’s house before without incident and had no reason to believe
that he would not do the same on the night of the shooting.” Id. Again, however,
it is the jury’s job to determine the credibility of the witness and the evidence
proffered. See Brief of Respondent, supra note 114.
117. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868; see MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(1) (2008).
118. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868; see MINN. STAT. § 609.185(a)(6)(c) (2008).
119. MINN. STAT. § 609.19, subdiv. 1(1) (2008). See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868.
During the trial, the court granted Back’s motion for acquittal on the first-degree
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sentencing, the trial judge stated
I think this was a situation where, in truth, Ms. Back, you
enjoyed and got some satisfaction out of having the young
men involved here respond to you and react to you . . . it
was foreseeable, I believe, to you that this could have
happened. I don’t believe you set out intending that
Danny be shot, but you acted in disregard of the obvious
risk that that could happen, and that’s why you are here
today being convicted—having been convicted by the
120
jury.
121
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
C.

The Supreme Court’s Holding in Back

The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Back’s petition for
122
review and unanimously reversed the court of appeals’ decision.
Instead of focusing on whether there was evidentiary support for
culpable negligence beyond a reasonable doubt, the supreme court
123
focused on whether Back owed Holliday a duty.
Using the duty
determination as a threshold question for the finding of culpable
negligence, the supreme court reversed the decision, because
“[t]he State did not introduce any evidence to support the
conclusion that Back had a relationship with Holliday suggesting
she would protect Holliday or that Holliday assumed she would
124
protect him”
and “there was no evidence to support the
conclusion that Back had an obligation to direct or control Super
125
in any way.”
domestic abuse charge and the second-degree intentional murder charge. Id. at
868–69. The court also granted the State’s motion to amend its complaint to
include the offense of second-degree manslaughter under Minnesota Statute
section 609.205(1) (2008). Id. at 869. The State also moved to dismiss the firstdegree premeditated murder charge. Id. Upon completion of the trial, the jury
found Back guilty of second-degree manslaughter based on culpable negligence.
Id. Thereafter, Back’s motion for a new trial was denied. Id. at 867.
120. Brief of Respondent, supra note 95, at *4–5 (emphasis added)(citations to
the trial transcript omitted).
121. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 869 n.5 (“While Back did not specifically argue in her briefs that she
did not owe a duty to Holliday, lack of a duty is implicit in Back’s argument that
she did not breach a duty.”).
124. Id. at 872.
125. Id. The court also stated that,
[b]ecause the State seeks to hold Back criminally responsible for the
criminal action of a third party, our cases require that the State prove
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BACK DECISION
The supreme court’s analysis in Back is interesting because it
seemingly fails to consider whether Back’s actions constituted
misfeasance or nonfeasance. This omission may have had an
important impact on the outcome.
A.

The Back Decision in View of the Misfeasance/Nonfeasance
Distinction

The supreme court first sets out to determine whether a duty is
126
owed and uses the common law civil standard as its guide.
Instead of focusing on characterizing Back’s actions, the supreme
127
court instead seems to focus on the acts of Super.
In so doing,
the court illustrates some of the confusion that an application of
128
the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction may cause.
For example, under a common law standard, such as the one
articulated by Cardozo, one would first determine whether an act
129
“positively or actively [worked] an injury.” If so, then there exists
a duty. Conversely, if the act instead “merely [withheld] a
130
benefit,”
one would then determine whether there was a
131
relationship that gave rise to a duty.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is in accord with this
approach when it articulates that the general operative principle is
a duty to protect against unreasonable risk of harm originating

that Back had a special relationship with either Super or with Holliday
that gave rise to a duty to control Super or to a duty to protect Holliday
against the actions of Super.
Id. at 871. The court also noted that “[t]he State’s focus on foreseeability does not
resolve the threshold question of Back’s duty.” Id. In a similar situation, the
supreme court explained that the “‘question is not simply whether a criminal
event is foreseeable, but whether a duty exists to take measures to guard against
it.’” Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 332 (Minn. 1985) (quoting Goldberg v.
Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962)).
126. See, e.g., Back, 775 N.W.2d at 869 (“A defendant cannot be negligent,
culpably or otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached.”).
127. See infra notes 140–43 and accompanying text.
128. See supra Part II. If the question of duty for a showing of culpable
negligence is answered using the civil standard, then the criminal act is only
relevant if the act is nonfeasance. Focusing on the criminal act is at best misplaced
until the act is characterized under the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.
129. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928)
(citation omitted).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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132

from one’s own affirmative act.
Only if the act is an act of
133
omission is the duty determination more restrictive.
Because the supreme court is applying the more restrictive
special relationship requirement, it seems fair to assume that the
court characterizes Back’s behavior as nonfeasance. However, Back
asked Super for a ride to a party hosted by someone she knew
Super had pointed a gun at and whose house he had previously
shot at; had knowledge that Super stored his gun in his car and
would pull his gun out on anyone with little provocation; and once
there, instigated a confrontation with Holliday by slapping a guest
134
and throwing at least one beer bottle down the stairs. In essence,
by bringing Super to the party, she provided the gasoline, and by
instigating a confrontation, she struck the match. Yet, despite all of
these elements under the control of Back that “positively or actively
135
[worked] an injury” to Holliday, the supreme court held that
136
there is no duty absent a special relationship.
The supreme court based its decision on precedent whereby
the criminal act is allowed to occur because of nonfeasance on the
137
part of the defendant. Where there is precedent of an affirmative
138
act leading to a finding of culpable negligence, the court does
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (“In general,
anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of
a reasonable man to protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm to them
arising out of the act.”).
133. See id. (“The duties of one who merely omits to act are more restricted,
and in general are confined to situations where there is a special relation between
the actor and the other which gives rise to the duty.”).
134. See supra Part III.
135. Moch Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 159 N.E. 896, 898 (N.Y. 1928).
136. See supra Part III.
137. See State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. 2009) (citing Pietila v.
Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Minn. 1985) (Yetka, J., dissenting) (reversing a
wrongful death action based in-part on the nonfeasance of the landowner)); Clark
v. Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705, 707–10 (Minn. 1996) (holding that the
nonfeasance of a property manager did not ripen into a duty to protect children
from sexual assault by another resident).
138. See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8 (citing State v. Schaub, 231 Minn. 512,
513–15, 44 N.W.2d 61, 62–63 (1950) (remanding the case after determining that
there could be culpable negligence on the part of the defendant when he, trying
to kill himself, flooded his apartment with natural gas, which ignited when the
landlord turned off the light to his apartment, causing an explosion and the death
of the landlord’s wife)); State v. Cantrell, 220 Minn. 13, 20–21, 18 N.W.2d 681,
684–85 (1945) (justifying a conviction of culpable negligence where the defendant
left a fumigation job knowing that the chemicals were dangerous, and, by a
combination of his failure to secure the door or leave a guard on-site, a child was
allowed to sneak into the building and died).
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not apply it because those cases do not involve criminal actions.
In focusing on the criminal act and not the act of the defendant,
the court has taken a seemingly misguided view regarding the
misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction.
140
For example, in Back, the court notes that “[State v. Schaub]
141
and [State v. Cantrell] are inapposite to the culpable negligence
issue presented in this case because, unlike this case, they do not
142
involve the criminal activity of a third person.” Yet, the culpable
143
negligence/duty issue
is not defined—and should not be
144
Under a
framed—by the criminal activity of others.
determination using the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,
Schaub or Cantrell are suitable because they deal with misfeasance of
the defendant instead of nonfeasance and, in that way, are arguably
145
more on point.
The court stated that “[t]his is the rule outside Minnesota as
well. In the few cases from other jurisdictions in which the
defendant was convicted of second-degree manslaughter for the
criminal actions of a third party, the courts have found a special
relationship exists as a predicate for a finding of criminal
146
negligence.”
It is true that a duty to prevent the harm arising
from the criminal acts of another because of nonfeasance on the
147
part of defendant generally requires a special relationship.

139. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8.
140. 231 Minn. 512, 44 N.W.2d 61 (1950).
141. 220 Minn. 13, 18 N.W.2d 681 (1945).
142. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.8.
143. See, e.g., id. at 869 (“A defendant cannot be negligent, culpably or
otherwise, unless the defendant has a duty that he or she breached.”).
144. See supra Part II.
145. See supra Part II.
146. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 n.6 (citing Palmer v. State, 164 A.2d 467 (Md.
1960) and State v. Zobel, 134 N.W.2d 101 (S.D. 1965)). Both cases appear to be
nonfeasance cases. The court stated that the court in Palmer “[held that] evidence
sufficient to support a conviction for second-degree manslaughter in a case in
which the defendant mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to beat her child brutally
and repeatedly, eventually resulting in the child’s death” and that the court in
Zobel “[upheld a] conviction for second-degree manslaughter where the defendant
father knew of his wife’s extensive abuse of their children but did nothing to stop
her.” Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 n.6 (emphasis added).
147. See supra Part II.
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Again, however, Back does not appear to be a case of
148
In particular, the
nonfeasance on the part of the defendant.
court of appeals noted that,
[t]o sustain a manslaughter conviction the defendant’s act
must be the “proximate cause [of death] without the
intervention of an efficient independent force in which
defendant did not participate or which he could not have
reasonably foreseen.” . . . The original negligence here
was appellant asking Super to drive her to [Holliday]’s
149
house.
Because the supreme court did not endeavor to make a
distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance, we are left to
divine how the court characterized Back’s behavior. Reasonable
questions regarding Back’s actions may include: Was it misfeasance
on the part of Back up to the point that Super pulled the gun and
was thereafter nonfeasance to try and stop him? And what would
have been required to characterize Back’s actions as misfeasance?
Because of this uncertainty, it would appear that the court is
implying that the conduct—criminal or otherwise—of the third
party is more dispositive than the act of the defendant when
establishing the existence of a common law duty.
Other
150
jurisdictions are not in accord with this position. Minnesota itself
has upheld a jury’s finding of liability under a negligence theory
when the defendant’s action created a risk of harm to the plaintiffs
151
by the criminal act of another.
152
Delgado v. Lohmar —which the court points to for the rule that
“[u]nder common law principles, there is generally no duty to
153
protect strangers from the criminal acts of a third party” —was
154
remanded because the court determined that there was a duty.
In Delgado, some hunters were “engaged in an extremely dangerous
155
activity, hunting with high-powered guns.”
The notion that
148. See generally State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2009) (indicating that the court of appeals did not treat the case as one of
nonfeasance).
149. Id. at *4–5 (emphasis added)(quoting Schaub v. Schaub, 231 Minn., 517,
517, 44 N.W.2d 61, 64) (1950)).
150. See, e.g., McIntyre, 447 F. Supp. 2d at 106–07.
151. See, e.g., supra notes 45–47.
152. 289 N.W.2d 479, 484 (Minn. 1979).
153. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866, 870 (Minn. 2009).
154. See Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 484 (“[D]ue care requires that each hunter be
mindful of the danger created by their entry to the occupants of the property”).
155. Id. (emphasis added).
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extremely dangerous activities may impose a duty was also
articulated in Back when the court stated that “[t]he theory
underlying these deadly weapons cases is that individuals handling
dangerous weapons have a duty of care not to handle them in such
a way so to harm others, and if they do, they have breached their
156
duty of care.”
However, such a statement does not take into consideration
why someone handling a dangerous weapon has a duty of care.
One rationale is handling a dangerous weapon is an affirmative act
157
and not an act of omission. Another rationale is that the risk of
injury is so foreseeable or that the harm so grave, that a duty is
158
imposed as a matter of law.
Thus, one could argue that the
stringent application of the special relationship requirement allows
the supreme court to completely ignore the magnitude of Back’s
reckless actions when she affirmatively acted as the catalyst in
159
creating a very combustible situation.
B.

The Back Decision and the Court’s View of the Special Relationship
Requirement

Assuming that Back’s acts were nonfeasance, by reversing the
decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court seemingly takes a very
narrow view of what constitutes a special relationship. The court
seems to ignore the fact that Back had a brief intimate relationship
160
with Super. Similarly, the court apparently ignored the fact that
161
Back had a long-term intimate relationship with Holliday and that

156. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 871 n.7.
157. This would be consistent with the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,
supra Part II.
158. This would be consistent with the special circumstances doctrine, supra
Part II.
159. See supra Part III.
160. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867. This determination was a foundation of the
court of appeal’s determination that the jury’s finding that Back was guilty of
second-degree manslaughter:
To support its case for second-degree manslaughter here, the state
introduced evidence of: (1) the prior intimate relationship between appellant
and Super; (2) appellant’s knowledge that Super previously fired a gun
into the victim’s garage; (3) appellant’s knowledge of the past conflicts
between Super and the victim; and (4) appellant’s knowledge that Super
carried a gun.
State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009)
(emphasis added).
161. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.
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162

Back considered Holliday the “‘love of [her] life.’”
Back at one time had been in a committed relationship with
163
164
Holliday, and had designs to resume a relationship with him.
While one or more persons in a failed relationship may be skeptical
of each other, it is not fair to say, as the supreme court has, that
there is generally no expectation to protect the other from harm,
much less no expectation to protect the other from harm that one
165
While special
has affirmatively brought to the other’s doorstep.
166
relationships are not predicated on love and affection, common
sense dictates that a reasonable person would try to protect the
167
“love of [their] life” from harm.
Had Super instead been a dangerous instrumentality, such as a
weapon, or a dangerous animal, the outcome may have been
different. For example, most would agree that the foreseeable risk
of harm resulting from bringing a time-bomb or a grizzly bear to
the party would give rise to a duty to protect others from those risks
168
associated with their arrival. Yet, Super’s actions are very similar
169
to those of a dangerous instrumentality or even a dangerous
170
Furthermore, this is not a situation where Holliday was
animal.
162. Id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 872.
166. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL HARMS § 41 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
167. Back, 775 N.W.2d at 867.
168. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 609.205 (2008). In particular, in State v. Frost, 342
N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 1983), the court held that firing a gun was consistent with the
creation of an unreasonable risk created as articulated by Minnesota Statute
section 609.205(1). Id. at 319–20. Also, under Minnesota Statute section
609.205(4), if Super arguendo had been an animal instead of a human, one could
make a showing that Back knew the animal had “vicious propensities or to have
caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, [and allowed the animal] to
run uncontrolled off the owner’s premises, or negligently [failed] to keep it
properly confined.” MINN. STAT. § 609.205(4) (2008).
169. See Back, 775 N.W.2d at 868. In similar fashion to a dangerous
instrumentality, Super was known to have a very volatile disposition and would
“‘pull his gun out on anybody.’” Id. In fact, the court of appeals analogized Super
to a dangerous instrumentality when it stated that “[j]ust as the appellant in Frost
should have known that the dangerous weapon she possessed was capable of being
discharged in a struggle, the jury could have reasonably concluded that appellant
should have known that Super was capable of shooting [Holliday].” State v. Back,
No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2009).
170. While it may not be palatable to consider a human an animal, we are part
of the animal kingdom and just because we have self-determination and the
capacity for rational thought does not mean that we are immune from
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fortuitously or randomly injured by the criminal acts of any third
171
Super and Holliday knew each other and had a very
person.
172
tumultuous relationship.
The facts indicate that Back was aware
of the tumult, and the trial court believed that she fed off of the
173
drama she instigated.
For at least the reasons articulated above, one could make the
argument that an expansion of the special relationship
174
requirement is warranted. Such an expansion would not toll the
death knell for judicial efficiency. As some of the cases note, even
where a duty does exist, there still may be causation issues that
175
would mitigate the number of cases tried by the courts.
While
causation poses its own challenges, the trial court judge, jury, and
court of appeals were all satisfied that the causation element was
176
met.

succumbing to our baser—more animalistic—instincts. See Back, 775 N.W.2d at
868 (noting that Super shot Holliday even though Back was screaming “[s]top,
Nicky, stop. Stop, Nicky, stop.”).
171. See, e.g., Pietila v. Congdon, 362 N.W.2d 328, 330 (Minn. 1985) (decedent
was assailed by unknown perpetrators while on the defendant’s premises). See also
Back, 775 N.W.2d at 870 (“[u]nder common law principles, there is generally no
duty to protect strangers from the criminal actions of a third party.”) (emphasis
added).
172. See supra Part III.
173. See supra Part III.
174. But see infra note 177 for reasons why an expansion may be against public
policy.
175. See, e.g., Pietila, 362 N.W.2d at 333 (“[E]ven if a duty to provide protection
were recognized, the question of causation would remain unanswered.”).
176. See State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2009). It should also be noted that the jury returned a verdict finding Back
guilty and that the court of appeals did not determine that this verdict was
unreasonable. See Back, 2009 WL 910756, at *1.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, this court’s review is
limited to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, is
sufficient to allow the jurors to reach the verdict that they did. The
reviewing court must assume “the jury believed the state’s witnesses and
disbelieved any evidence to the contrary.” And the reviewing court will
not disturb the verdict if the jury, acting with due regard for the
presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, could reasonably conclude that the defendant was
guilty of the charged offense.
Id. at *1 (citations omitted). Had there been a causation issue, any of the trial
judge’s actions, jury verdict, or court of appeals decision would have likely
reflected that fact.
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There are a number of arguments to be made that a finding of
duty under these circumstances would contravene public policy—
such as judicial inefficiency because of the increased focus on the
177
use of standards, instead of no-duty rules.
However, arguments
directed to judicial inefficiency exist regardless of whether the act is
characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance, because judicial
resources are necessarily consumed when determining whether an
178
In
act should be characterized as misfeasance or nonfeasance.
addition, some of these same policy concerns seem to fall away
179
when the court is dealing with misfeasance.
180
In Greater Houston Transportation Co. v. Phillips, where the
defendant’s employee shot and seriously injured another driver
with whom the employee had gotten into an accident, Justice
Doggett’s dissent touched on the difficulty that these no-duty
decisions create in establishing precedent when he stated

177. See generally Adler, supra note 2, at 911–26 (enumerating arguments that
are utilized in opposition to a move towards a general duty of reasonable care,
including issues with causation, individual liberty, societal values, and the
impracticability in practice of the general duty of reasonable care: “Opposition to
proposals for expanding the duty to act affirmatively to aid or protect another is
based upon both substantive and ‘process’concerns. The primary substantive
arguments are that: (1) because a failure to act does not ‘cause’ harm, no liability
should attach without misfeasance; and (2) positive duties would both interfere
with individual liberties and would negatively affect society by requiring altruistic
behavior. The more telling arguments, however, are those that suggest that the
judicial system would be strained by an expansion of the duty to [aid or protect].
Some of those arguments arise whenever a court chooses to rely upon standards
rather than rules. Other arguments specifically address difficulties anticipated if
obligations to [aid or protect] were expanded.” Id. at 911 (citations omitted)).
The argument could also be made that a general standard is more
comprehensible than a no-duty rule with a collection of duty exceptions and that
any judicial inefficiency may be worth it to that end. Id. at 920. In particular,
[p]eople can understand a rule that says, “generally, you are expected to
conduct yourself reasonably” more easily than they can understand the
common law rule with its various exceptions or, perhaps even a rule that
requires one to rescue or protect, but only where to do so would be
“easy.”
Id.
178. In other words, because the misfeasance/nonfeasance determination is a
threshold question, the court must always characterize the action of the defendant
in order to determine whether a no-duty rule is appropriate (and must expend
judicial resources in the determination). See supra Part II.
179. See supra note 177. The three primary substantive arguments seem to be
specifically targeted to situations whereby we attempt to hold people accountable
for their nonfeasance.
180. 801 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett, J., dissenting).
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[o]n another day we may learn how many more shootings
are required before a jury can be permitted to evaluate
the reasonableness of this [defendant]’s decision. A
dozen people killed or maimed? Perhaps not; under its
narrow holding, today’s opinion may itself be sufficient
additional notice for a court to impose a duty on the
181
[defendant] to avert injury to third persons.
Perhaps here, too, the opinion in Back will provide “sufficient
additional notice for a court to impose a duty on the [defendant]
182
Because, “[w]hen [the] ghosts
to avert injury to third persons.”
of the past stand in the path of justice[,] clanking their medieval
chains[,] the proper course for the judge is to pass through them
183
undeterred.”
V.

CONCLUSION

184

In Back, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to offer a
compelling reason explaining why Back’s actions should be
considered nonfeasance.
If Back’s actions were considered
misfeasance instead, then the court failed to explain why the
special relationship requirement was required to find the existence
of a duty. In addition, the court seemed to ignore other policy
considerations that may have warranted an extension of the special
relationship requirement.
For example, the court could have held, as the court of
185
appeals seemed to imply, that the previous intimate relationships
between Back and Holliday or Back and Super were sufficient to
186
create a duty to protect Holliday from Super. In the alternative,
the supreme court could have broadened an application of the
special circumstances doctrine to hold that Back’s actions
constituted a special circumstance that created a duty to protect
Holliday against the foreseeable danger that she created, based in
part on the knowledge she had at her disposal regarding the
187
danger that Super represented.
181. Id. at 528.
182. Id.
183. United Australia, Ltd. v. Barclays Bank, Ltd., [1941] A.C. 1 (H.L.) 29
(appeal taken from Eng.).
184. State v. Back, 775 N.W.2d 866 (Minn. 2009).
185. See State v. Back, No. A08-0017, 2009 WL 910756, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App.
Apr. 7, 2009), rev’d, 775 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 2009).
186. See supra Part IV.
187. See supra Part III.
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Regardless of the approach, the supreme court’s decision in
Back illustrates the problems in duty determinations under the
misfeasance/nonfeasance rubric. A more sensible holding would
be that “an actor is always under the duty to see that other persons
are not immediately exposed to an unreasonable risk from [their]
188
acts.”
Such a concept is succinctly captured by section seven of
189
Back’s actions foreseeably,
the Restatement (Third) of Torts.
unreasonably, and immediately created a risk of harm for Holliday
when she arrived with Super. Once there, her behavior only served
to magnify the risk of harm.
If we endeavor to create jurisprudence that reflects an
incorporation of a greater deference to a general duty of
190
reasonable care, the misfeasance/nonfeasance distinction in the
duty analysis should be put to rest. In its misapplication, the
distinction allows courts to hold that “‘criminal acts of third
191
parties . . . relieve the original negligent party from liability.’” But
as a general proposition, “[t]his archaic doctrine has been rejected
192
everywhere.”
193
Unfortunately, it seems this “archaic doctrine” has not been
rejected in Minnesota.

188. Fowler V. Harper & Posey M. Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 887 (1934).
189. See supra Part II and note 84.
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing when “duty to exercise
reasonable care” attaches). See generally supra Part II (explaining Minnesota’s move
to a general duty of reasonable care).
191. Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ky. 1991) (alteration in original)
(holding that defendant was liable for the damage caused by a fire because its
handling of refuse created an opportunity for an unknown arsonist to allegedly
start the fire).
192. Id.
193. Id.
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